>>12244712>your will is unfree in the sense that you will do whatever you want, while being unable to control what you want.Depends. Speaking ethically or existentially, yes, we are all slaves to our desires, and that rare man who is able to control his own can be considered "free" in the truest sense of the word. However, when we're talking about free will vs. determinism in analytic philosophy, we're usually not talking about personal willpower. The question is not "Does person so-and-so have free will?", but rather, "Does any person have free will?".
Hard determinism has very strict commitments. Defenders of free will typically want to describe free will as commonplace and possessed by the majority of humans (for reasons of morality or plausibility), but they don't actually have to. All that is required to disprove hard determinism is a single causal event which meets the criteria for "free-willed action". Of course, what exactly that entails is up for debate, but it's generally accepted to require both an element of freedom (i.e., the agent could've* chosen otherwise) and an element of sourcehood (i.e., the action must have originated with the agent himself). Both of these are somewhat controversial, and honestly the literature is not for my tastes, but I can tell you that classical compatibilism is no longer the dominant position, as both determinists and libertarians move towards more sophisticated accounts of agent-causation and moral responsibility which has kind of left nothing in the middle.