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Quoted By:
"well it's a dilemma."
Yes. I read your dilemma two days ago.
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"if you think of the Euthyphro dilemma as like p or ~p, and then pr and ~ps for the consequences of the horns, ..."
How is the Euthyphro dilemma like an instance of LEM? It seems like it is an exhaustive disjunction, a disjunction P ∨ Q where just P and Q alone exhaust the possibilities. Otherwise, it would be a false dichotomy.
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"... this version gets you to the same r and s but in a more direct way"
To back up this assertion, that the R and S of your dilemma are the consequences of the P and Q of the Euthyphro dilemma, you first have to prove that the two options of your dilemma (either the Good or moral facts (your choice) are metaphysically necessary, or they are metaphysically contingent) are consequences, in horned-dilemma fashion, to the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma (either a decision is right because a god says it is right, or a god says it is right because it is, in fact, right). It is not obvious that this assertion of yours is correct.
Anyway, to your question about goodness and morals being either metaphysically necessary or contingent from the Abrahamic god...
Depending on how the Abrahamic god is characterized will determine what will be metaphysically necessary from him. Most accounts would have goodness (specifically however which way that is characterized) be metaphysically necessary from the Abrahamic god, but morals (however which way those are characterized) are more controversial. It might indicate they are metaphysically contingent from the Abrahamic god.
It still seems to me there is a presumed perspective here on your end as to how gods saying things, a fact of the matter about certain decisions being right, and metaphysical modality all relate. I do not doubt they do relate, but I am not clued into where you were going with all this.
Yes. I read your dilemma two days ago.
---
"if you think of the Euthyphro dilemma as like p or ~p, and then pr and ~ps for the consequences of the horns, ..."
How is the Euthyphro dilemma like an instance of LEM? It seems like it is an exhaustive disjunction, a disjunction P ∨ Q where just P and Q alone exhaust the possibilities. Otherwise, it would be a false dichotomy.
---
"... this version gets you to the same r and s but in a more direct way"
To back up this assertion, that the R and S of your dilemma are the consequences of the P and Q of the Euthyphro dilemma, you first have to prove that the two options of your dilemma (either the Good or moral facts (your choice) are metaphysically necessary, or they are metaphysically contingent) are consequences, in horned-dilemma fashion, to the two options of the Euthyphro dilemma (either a decision is right because a god says it is right, or a god says it is right because it is, in fact, right). It is not obvious that this assertion of yours is correct.
Anyway, to your question about goodness and morals being either metaphysically necessary or contingent from the Abrahamic god...
Depending on how the Abrahamic god is characterized will determine what will be metaphysically necessary from him. Most accounts would have goodness (specifically however which way that is characterized) be metaphysically necessary from the Abrahamic god, but morals (however which way those are characterized) are more controversial. It might indicate they are metaphysically contingent from the Abrahamic god.
It still seems to me there is a presumed perspective here on your end as to how gods saying things, a fact of the matter about certain decisions being right, and metaphysical modality all relate. I do not doubt they do relate, but I am not clued into where you were going with all this.
