>>20829502All universality and all particularity must in this sense be determined by the being-for-self;
and all being-for-self is determined in relation to these distinctions, and the opposition of the two is its essence. If the indifferent essence of all being-for-self were not this opposition, it would be a simple self-preserving relation-to-self.
If the essence of being-for-self were no opposition but simple and universal, it would not be a being-for-self. Its essence would be no more and no less than pure determinateness.
For such an essence could not differentiate itself into self-certainty, because it would be nothing but the self-moving universality. The negativity of being-for-other is precisely its essence of the Notion of the determinate object in itself.
Thus is it an immanent necessity of self-consciousness. This externalization of self-differentiating unity, therefore, would have the form of simplicity, but not of simple sense-certainty.
The self-related negation is immanent, but not immanent as a self-subsistent absolute Notion, for the determinateness of the in-itself is one of the self-identical self-positing 'I'.
The essence of self-related being-for-self as [merely] being-for-and-within-itself is also the negative universal negation of being-for-another.
Insofar as the essence of being-for-self is being-for-and-within-itself, the pure thought of being-for-and-within-itself is this essence of being-for-other.
