>>6458639You barely understand war theory,
The Americans invaded Canada in an opportunistic bid to annex it, and had every invasion repelled. They thought the British couldn't wage war against Napoleon and the US simultaneously, thus concluding the conquest would be easy.
It is no coincidence that the Americans declared war 6 days before the Grand Armée marched into Russia.
British impressment of British deserters was a vital wartime practice to ensure the Royal Navy had the manpower to wage war against Napoleon, a practice they could not and did not surrender. By British law, the deserters owed service to the Crown, and could be forced into service if necessary. Nationality was not transferable in the UK, thus the Americans’ pleas that the sailors were American were dismissed. Impressment ended once Napoleon was defeated. It is not mentioned in the Treaty of Ghent.
Contary to the seemingly prevalent belief, the US lost the naval war. The Royal Navy established naval domination by employing an economic blockade the Americans were unable to break. US warships spent most of the war bottled up in ports, escaping only during ideal weather.
Ship-on-ship victories do not equal strategic effect. USS Constitution’s naval victories were all against smaller, weaker British ships—as were all of the US Navy’s ship-on-ship victories. It's telling that the 3 essentially equal ship-on-ship engagements—Chesapeake–Shannon, Essex–Phoebe, President–Endymion—were all won by the British.
Having your warships trapped in ports for the majority of war, failing to defeat your enemie’s core naval strategy, and failing to undermine your enemie’s naval imperium along your coast is not a naval victory. Using ship-on-ship engagements as the metric of victory dismisses the bigger, more significant picture.
