>>1752269>an inherently more complicated and risky scheme when compared to a linked system.It's not because there should only be one person flying the plane at a time. The problems arise when you don't have affirmative control transfer.
>>1752262>That procedure (pressing a button meant for another function for a certain period of time) only makes sense if your goal is to debug the system, not as a proper control scheme. What I´m talking about would require a dedicated two position button with physical indication of the position it´s in, otherwise it´s going to be overlooked in an emergency.The proper control scheme already exists and it is called affirmative control transfer.
"I have control."
"You have control."
"I have control."
The failure of AF447 was humans failing to follow proper crew resource management. It was the failure of the captain to take control when the situation warranted. It is the classic aircraft incident: human error. You will never be able to design it away. It is clear you aren't a) a pilot and b) an idiot. Furthermore, there are already indications and annunciations for side stick priority. See pic related.