>>1300911And then the FAC cut out when overspeed occured, and the plane software found that stall and overspeed were incompatible and then went into Alternate Law.
Airbus updated the software for all Airbuses then and it was mandated through an Airworthiness Directive for the A330 and A340 types, while Airbus also updated the A320 software just in case.
The only other repeat occurance of this fault was in an RAF A330 MRTT "Voyager" which was not subject to the Airworthiness Directive because it was a military registered aircraft, not a civilian one. The RAF then updated the software which brought it in line with the civilian models.
>>1301024If the plane is telling you that, you are in a stall, the question will be, what is causing the stall warning?
The fact that the pilots were unaware of the MCAS system and how it behaves probably confused them to no end. In a stall situation, the issue there is gettting your nose down and getting the airspeed up. If you get a stall warning, you're going to want to see what's causing the stall, and if nothing makes sense, you're probably not going to question the aircraft trimming down, unless you know that there is a system which will pitch down.
I suppose the question of pilot training does apply here, but if the plane is giving you stick shaker and is trimming down, the first thing you think about is, "what is causing this?". I think that's why the F/O reached for the QRH in order to troubleshoot. Not knowing that there is a system which will aggressively trim down contributed to Lion Air.
Ultimately, I think this is one of those cases of multiple things went wrong. Pilots experienced nose down and stick shaker, crew were unaware of the existence of the MCAS system and how it behaves (and how it can malfunction), crew did not pay attention to the trim wheel, as they were confused as to why the aircraft thought it was stalling. I think these pilots are underestimating the stress of a false stall warning.
