>>1877880>>1877907Stall warnings are triggered based on AOA sensors and there's no reason to suspect they iced up in AF447, and even if only one were working the warning should have triggered.
The pilot is heard to react to a "Stall" warning on the CVR initially by responding "What's that?"
This implies a lack of understanding of what it meant, either because they thought it was triggered by their faulty airspeed data (or possibly because they spoke english as a second language and were really badly trained, but that's just my schizo theory)
Michel Aseline's desire to clear his name is understandable, but even he won't deny that he:
- was flying an airshow
- much lower than was safe, over terrain he was not familiar with (and where the place he was supposed to fly over was not where he thought)
- with passengers onboard
- on the very border of the stall aoa, where there was no room for the plane to pitch up at all without losing lift
- at idle thrust
Normally the autothrottle would kick in and apply full thrust, but he'd disabled that in order to pull the stick all the way back and get to max aoa.
His claim is that when he finally applied full thrust, the engines took too long to reach full power from idle.
However, even a perfectly normal jet engine will take a while to reach full power, hence the BAE 146's weird speedbrake arrangement.
He also claims that the plane "pushed its nose down" when he applied full backstick which he knows full well is a necessary result of alpha protection and he was relying on this phenomenon to do the airshow.
There's not really any actual proof beyond "I don't like the scary computer plane" that any falsification occurred in either of those investigations. However, there are design changes I'd like to see made, especially after AF447.
