>>99972277On the Replaceability of the Virtual Self: A Philosophical Inquiry into Kotoku Koinuko’s Model
Abstract
This essay explores the ontological and ethical implications of replacing a digital persona—specifically, the vtuber Kotoku Koinuko—by treating the sale of her model not merely as a commercial transaction, but as a challenge to the notion of personal identity and performative continuity. Drawing from metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and media theory, this piece examines whether a digital self, once unmoored from its performer, can persist as 'the same'—and if not, what that says about personhood in the age of simulation.
1. Introduction: A Doggirl Disappears
On May 9th, 2025, a post on the imageboard /vt/ announced the sale of a digital model on twitter: “Controversial /choc/ darling and dog-themed vtuber Kotoku Koinuko’s model is for sale” (Anonymous, 05/09/25). What does it mean to sell a self? Is the persona of Kotoku Koinuko something transferrable, a shell that can be re-inhabited by another? Or is it fundamentally linked to the performer who once gave it voice and breath? At first glance, this appears to be a simple market transaction: a 3D model changing hands. But it also invites a deeper ontological inquiry. If someone else adopts this digital body and continues the performance, is that still Kotoku Koinuko? Or is she—like Theseus’s Ship—rebuilt piece by piece until she is no longer what she was?
2. The Virtual Persona and the Problem of Identity
The identity of a vtuber is hybrid: part avatar, part performer, part social narrative. Unlike traditional actors who perform in a range of roles, vtubers are expected to be their characters continuously—on-stream, on Twitter, in fan discourse. The illusion of a stable self is essential.
Derek Parfit’s theories on personal identity are instructive here. In Reasons and Persons (1984), Parfit argues that identity is not what matters in survival—psychological continuity and connectedness are. If someone acquires Koinuko’s model but lacks her memories, voice, and performative style, then psychological continuity is broken. Thus, Parfit might argue that the new performer is not Koinuko but a distinct entity—a simulacrum using borrowed skin.
3. The Skin Without the Soul: Baudrillard and Simulacra
Jean Baudrillard’s theory of the simulacrum also casts light on this transaction. In Simulacra and Simulation (1981), Baudrillard warns that in the postmodern era, simulations precede and determine reality. Kotoku Koinuko’s model is not just a representation of a persona—it is the persona, to many fans. But when the performer leaves, what remains is a hollow shell: a second-order simulacrum, a sign with no referent.
Replacing her with a new actor may simulate continuity, but it creates what Baudrillard might call a hyperreality: the illusion of identity without essence. Fans may resist the replacement precisely because it reminds them that there never was a “real” Koinuko—only performance, algorithm, and affect.
4. Embodiment, Authenticity, and the Ethics of Replacement
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body complicates this further. In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), he argues that subjectivity is embodied—that our body is not a thing we have but a mode of being. In the virtual realm, embodiment is digital and performative. The body (model) of Kotoku Koinuko is her mode of being, but it is also mediated entirely through voice, movement, and interaction.
5. Conclusion: Can a Doggirl Be Replaced?
In a metaphysical sense, no. The persona of Kotoku Koinuko is a convergence of voice, narrative, interaction, and cultural moment. To replace her is to instantiate a new being, even if the model remains unchanged. In the same way that a clone of a person is not that person, a new performer wearing the Koinuko model is not Koinuko—at least not in any way that preserves continuity of identity. But in the postmodern theatre of the internet, perhaps that doesn’t matter. Perhaps, as Baudrillard suggests, the original was already a simulation. Perhaps, like actors who inherit a role in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, new performers will reinterpret the doggirl for a new generation.
Even so, something vital is lost in the transfer. Identity, once performative and communal, is reduced to asset. And that, more than anything, marks the difference between self and simulation.
Works Cited
Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser, University of Michigan Press, 1994.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith, Routledge, 2002.
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press, 1984.
Anonymous. “Kotoku Koinuko model for sale.” /choc/, 05/09/25.
https://x.com/pubbyko/status/1920669648254534063 
